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indicates that it was unlikely that
would agree on a course
of action during dissolution that would be in their common
interest.
[15] Finally, the Crockers contend that the corporation is
not "in the process of voluntary winding up" because there
was no
notice of a meeting of shareholders (see Corp.
Code, § 2201, subd. (e) ) and all the shareholders did not
approve the dissolution in lieu of a special meeting. (See
Corp. Code, § 2239.) Section 4600 provides for a vote or
written consent. Sections
subdivision (e), and 2239 would
apply only if the election to dissolve had been by vote rather
than by written consent.
The orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
11, 1957.

[8. F. No. 19484. In Bank.

Nov. 12, 1957.1

GEORGE F. FOX III et al., Respondents, v. JAMES P.
ACED et al., Appellants.
[la, lb] Exchange of Property-Construction of Contract.-Under
an agreement for exchange of real property providing that m
the event either party was unable to deliver his property within 90 days from the date of the contract "upon the terms
specified" the contract should be void, defendants' obligation
to complete a building on industrial property pursuant to a
lease-purchase agreement was not a condition of delivering
the property under the exchange agreement, and they were
not released from liability for breach of the exchange agreement on the ground that such building had not been completed,
where such completion was not expressly provided in defendants' promise to convey the property free and clear of certain
encumbrances, and where an intent not to include such completion among "the terms specified" was indicated by defend[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Exchange of Property, § 7; Am.Jur., Trades
nnd Exchanges of Property, § 13.
Mc:K. Dig. References: [1, 2] Exchange of Property, § 9; [3]
Damages, § 136; [4] Exchange of Property, § 39.

ants' promise,
"to complete all
obligations now
[plaintiffs] harmless for any and all
lessee thereunder."
[2] !d.-Construction of
ambiguity in an addendum to an agreement for the
of real property should
be resolved against the party that wrote the addendum.
[3] Damages-Exemplary
are not
recoverable against a defendant who acts in
faith and
under the advice of counsel.
[4] Exchange of Property-Damages.-A finding that defendants'
breach of their contract for exchange of property was committed in "bad faith" within the meaning of Civ. Code, § 3306,
was not sustained where the evidence disclosed that, as a
result of the construction of a building on defendant's industrial property for the specific use of a tenant, there existed
at the time the exchange agreement was entered into two liens
of record, as well as a dispute between defendants and the
construction company concerning noncompletion of the building in accordance with plans and specifications, of which plaintiffs were aware, that it was because of these factors that the
exchange agreement provided for a 90-day period for delivery
of the property, that during this period one defendant unsuccessfully made repeated efforts to have the building completed, and that defendants acted in good faith in relying on
the advice of counsel in refusing to perform the contract.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Murray Draper, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for breach of a realty exchange contract. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed.
Wexler & Wexler and Louis E. Wexler for Appellants.
Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll & Thompson, Robert T. Thompson and Richard C. Amick for Respondents.
McCOMB, J.-From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs for
the sum of $2,950 after trial before the court without a jury,
in an action to recover damages pursuant to the provisions
of section 3306 of the Civil Code for an alleged breach of an
agreement for the exchange of real property, defendants
appeal.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d,

§ 278 et seq.

and defendants entered into an
in
for certain industrial
were to convey a certain house and
lot to defendants and pay them $14,000 in cash. The industrial
was
to a lease and purchase agreement between defendants as lessor-vendor and Sequoia Metalcraft
and others
referred to as ''the tenant") as lessee-vendee. An addendum to the exchange agreement
"In the event either First Party [plaintiffs] or Second
Party
is unable to deliver his property within
ninety (90)
from the date of this contract, upon the
terms specified, then this contract shall be null and void and
each party, in that event, shall hereby release the other of
and from all liability hereunder.
"First Party agrees to pay Fourteen Thousand & No/100
($14,000.00) Dollars cash on closing of this transaction. Rents
to be prorated thirty (30) days from date of execution of this
contract and payable on closing. Taxes, insurance, utilities
and all other expenses relative to the upkeep of the subject
properties are to be prorated as of the date of closing, which
is to be no later than ninety (90) days from the date of this
contract. Each party will pay expenses on property now
owned by him until actual closing. Second Party agrees to
complete all obligations now owing to lessee and to hold First
Party harmless for any and all claims made by lessee thereunder.''
The trial court found that (1) defendants breached the
exchange agreement, and (2) "defendants' failure and refusal to perform said agreement on their part was deliberate, willful, capricious and without just cause and excuse,
and without just or lawful reason therefor."
These questions are presented for our determination:
[la] First. Did defend4nts breach the exchange agreement?
Yes. Defendants claimed that they were unable within the
90-day period to deliver the industrial property ''upon the
terms specified'' and that they were thereby released from
all liability under the agreement by the provisions of the
first sentence of the addendum set forth above.
Defendants \Yere obligated under their lease-purchase agreement with the tenant to construct a building on the industrial
property, and they predicate their inability to perform the
exchange agreement upon the ground that the construction
of this building had not been completed.
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This
the ""'""t.um: Was the completion of such
construction among
""'JH'·'"'"- ' in the exchange
agreement¥
It was not expressly so specified in that clause of the agreement whereby defendants promised to convey the industrial
property ''free and clear of all encumbrances excepting easements, restrictions and rights of way of record and said
Lease Agreement and said purchase agreement [between defendants and the tenant] and tax liens which are the responsibility of the tenant."
An intent not to include such completion among "the
terms specified" is indicated by defendants' promise, expressed in the last sentence of the addendum, ''to complete
all obligations now owing to lessee and to hold First Party
[plaintiffs] harmless for any and all claims made by lessee
thereunder." This promise was calculated to meet the situation that would obtain if, when the sale was consummated,
the sellers had not yet completely performed all of their
obligations toward the tenant, including completion of the
building. It indicated that the sale was to proceed regardless
of such completion. [2] The addendum was written by defendants, and any ambiguity should be resolved against them.
[lb] Likewise, the realtor through whom the parties negotiated testified that defendant James P. Aced explained to him
that a lien filed against the property by one of the building
contractors, Marshall Electric Company, was in litigation and
Mr. Aced explained that he thought he could have this lien
released quickly but wanted the 90 days to get rid of it, "that
is why we set up the 90-day closing." It is thus clear that
performance of defendants' obligation to the tenant to complete the building was not a condition of delivering the
property.
The Marshall Electric Company lien was paid off nearly
30 days before the expiration of the 90-day period; the only
other lien involved was that of the general building contractor, Carlray Company, in the amount of $10,000-$1,400
of which defendants disputed as being for extras ordered by
the tenant. About two weeks before the expiration of the
90 days, plaintiffs paid the $1,400 on behalf of the tenant
so that the only remaining lien on the 90th day was one which
defendant James P. Aced testified he did not question. He
admitted that he was agreeable to paying it and conceded that
the lien could have been liquidated by using a portion of the
money that plaintiffs had already put in escrow to defendants'
credit.

Fox v. AcED

385

[49 C.2d 381: 317 P.2d 608]

Since defendants failed and refused to convey the property
to plaintiffs, the
of the trial court that they had
breached the exchange agreement, in view of the aoove evidence. is amply supported by the record.
Second: Was defendants' breach of the.ir contract committed ~n "bad fatth" withtn the meaning of that phrase as
used in sectton 3306 of the Civil Code?
No. [3] Exemplary damages are not recoverable against
a defendant who acts in good faith and under the advice of
counsel. (Selden v. Cashman, 20 Cal. 56,67 [81 Am.Dec 931:
Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 CaL2d 632, 649 [198 P.2d lj; Fetterly v. Salyer, 96 CaLApp.2d 240, 244 [5] [215 P.2d 64].
A.bbott v. '76 Land & Water Co., 103 Cal. 607. 609 [37 P 5271:
Bonesteel v. Bonesteel, 30 Wis. 511, 513; Devenny v. The Mascotte. 72 F 684. 686; ct .Johnson v. Southern Pac Co., 157
Cal. 333. 338 [107 P 6111; Perry v. Washtngton Nat. Ins. Co ..
14 Cal.App.2d 609. 617 [71 [58 P.2d 701, 59 P.2d 158].
Haydel v. Morton, 19 Cal.App.2d 697,700 [41 [66 P.2d 204).
United States v. Homestake Mtn. Co., 117 F. 481. 488 [54
C.C.A. 3031: 25 C.J.S. (1941 ), Damages,§ 123e, p. 727.)
Section 3306 of the Civil Code reads: ''The detriment
caused by the breach of an agreement to convey an estate in
real property, is deemed to be the price paid, and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title and preparing
the necessary papers, with interest thereon; but adding thereto, in case of bad faith, the difference between the price agreed
to be paid and the value of the estate agreed to be conveyed.
at the time of the breach, and the expenses properly incurred
in preparing to enter upon the land." (Italics added.)
[4] The record discloses that for a number of weeks prior
to July 2, 1954, the parties had been attempting through a
mutual realtor to agree upon an exchange agreement that was
satisfactory to all parties concerned.
The building on defendants' industrial property was con·
structed for them by Carlray Company for the specific use of
the tenant. As a result of the construction. there existed at
the time the exchange agreement was entered into two liens
of record, as well as a dispute between defendants and Carl·
ray Company concerning the noncompletion of the building in
accordance with plans and specifications.
Pla1ntiffs on .T nly 2. 1954. were aware of the existence of
the two he'lls of reC'ord. as well as the controversy between
defendants and Carlray Company. It was because of these
49 C.2d-13

c.~

factors that the

contained this provision:
or Second Party is unable
to deliver his property within
(90) days from the
date of this contract, upon the terms specified, theu this contract shall be null aud void and each party, in that event,
shall
release the other of and from all liability hereunder.''
referred
defendant James P.
Aced made
to have the building completed,
all without success.
1954, plaintiffs deposited their money and deed with the title company. Defendants did not succeed in obtaining the completion of the
building, and they did not, within said 90-day period or at
any time thereafter, deliver their property to plaintiffs or
deposit a deed thereto with the title company.
On numerous occasions during the foregoing transactions
defendant James P. Aced consulted with an attorney, and
when it became evident to him that the building would not
be completed by the builder within the 90-day period, he
sought his attorney's advice relative to his rights and obligations under his agreement with plaintiffs. He testified that
"I was continually going to my attorney two or three times
a week asking, 'How can I complete this deal,' and I was
following his advice right down the line." The record also
discloses that his attorney told him: "It is very clear to me
that the second wire revqkes the first wire giving you additional time, that Mr. :F'ox does not want to give you additional
time and the 90-day period having expired the entire deal
under the terms of the exchange agreement, by which it states
that either party may withdraw after 90 days, has terminated
and there is no further deal.''
The evidence likewise discloses that James P. Aced relied
and acted upon advice of counsel. Since the evidence discloses that defendants acted in good faith in relying upon
the advice of counsel in refusing to perform their contract,
the trial court's finding that they acted in bad faith within
the meaning of section 3306 of the Civil Code is not sustained.
Hence, to predicate damages upon the bad faith of defendants
was erroneous.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J .-I dissent.
I agree with the first point in the majority opinion that it
was not necessary to complete the building before defendant
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was obligated to transfer the
but cannot agree that
there was insufficient evidence to show bad faith on the part
of defendant as used in section 3306 of the Civil Code quoted
in the majority
The trial court found that there
was bad faith on defendant's
in refusing to
a:o;
pointed out in the
and, in my
the
evidence was sufficient to support that
Assuming that advice of
which is followed, shows
good faith and there is evidence that such advice was given
and followed, there is evidence in the record here which
clearly shows bad faith. Mr. Ross, the real estate broker
handling the deal for both parties, testified that during the
90-day period defendant refused to complete the deal unless
plaintiffs paid for a rock fill in connrction with the building
which plaintiffs were not obligated to do; that plaintiffs would
waive completion of the building; that defendant was not
''particularly interested'' in having a conference with his
counsel and Ross; that he wanted a release from the tenant
of his property under the lease and was told that the tenant
was willing to accept the buildings; that defendant said he
"wouldn't close [the deal] in any event. He said, 'There is
not only the question of the rock fill which hasn't been settled, but' he said that he wasn't going to do business with
Mr. Fox [plaintiff). I asked Mr. Aced, 'Well, is this just a
grudge?' and he said, 'No, but I just don't like Mr. Fox.'
"I asked Mr. Aced, 'Would you close this transaction with
anybody else'!' He said, 'Anybody else b1tt Mr. Pox.'
"We spoke on, and I asked Mr. Aced just what it was that
he wanted at this time to close the deal with Mr. Fox, didn't
he have any idea of what he wanted. lie thought for a minute,
and he wrote down seven points which he wanted to close the
deal with Mr. Pox, and it amounted to appr·oximately $5,000
or more." (Emphasis added.) The latter things plaintiff was
not required to do. Defendant knew that the liens on the
property could be removed by instructing the escrow agent
to withhold them from the money deposited in escrow by plaintiff. The evidence is clear that defendant deliberately refused
to carry out the agreement. This evidence was weighed by
the trial court against the evidence that defendant acted on
the advice of counsel. Hence the judgment is supported by
the evidence. The evidence that defendant acted on the
advice of counsel obviously could have been disbelieved by
the trial court.
It must be remembered that the test of bad faith under
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section 3306 of the Civil Code, supra, is whether there is a
deliberate refusal to perform without just cause or excuse
(Nelson v. F'ernando Nelson & Sons, 5 Cal.2d 511 [55 P.2d
'lfi9]; Engasser v . •]ones, 88 Cal.App.2d 171 [198 P.2d 5461.
Pixley v. F'irst F'ederal Sav. & Loan Assn .. 110 Cal.App.2d
427 (243 P.2d 100]; .Johnson v Goldberg, 130 Cal.App.2d
571 [279 P.2d 131]; Rasmussen v. Moe, 138 Cal.App.2d 49~
f292 P.2d 2261) and whether there is good or bad faith 1s a
question of fact (Rasmussen v. Moe, s1tpra, 138 Cal.App.2d
t99).
As stated, proof that a party acted on the advice of counsel
may be a factor in establishing the defense of good faith
However, in situations where the advice of counsel is a defense
against punitive damages, malicious prosecution, and som~='
other torts. there must be a full and fair disclosure of all
the facts to counsel. For illustration it is said: ''Advice of
counsel. to be admissible evidence in mitigation of damage;;
in any case. must appear to have been given upon a full an(i
fair statement of the facts or of such of them as were material
to the question on which counsel was consulted." (15 Am.Jur ..
Damages. § 354.) And in regard to malicious prosecution
·'The solicitation of advice of counsel and the fact that in
mstituting the action complained of one acted on the opinion
and advice of counsel may constitute a complete defense to
an action for malicious prosecution. provided the opinion was
based on a full and fair statement of the facts or on knowledgt
rlerived from independent mvesttgation, and was sought and
acted on tn good faith." (Emphasis added; 32 Cal.Jur.2d.
Malicious Prosecution. § 25.) ''In order to establish the defence of advice of counseL the defendant in an action foT
malicious prosecution must show that the advice relied on
was given by counsel after a full and fair disclosure, withvut
any suppression, evasion. or falsehood, of all the facts known
to the complainant. or which he should have known, tending
to prove or disprove his claim or the crime charged." (Ibid
~ 29.) "The rule that advice of counsel is a defense to an
action of malicious prosecution is qualified by the require
ment that the element of good faith be present throughout
Advice of counsel. accordingly. affords no defense unless
it is sought in good faith and not as a mere rloak to protect
meself against such an action or to refute the theory of
maHce Such advic0 must have been based on the entire good
faith of the defendant in the presentation of his facts. It musl
further appear, affirmatively, that the defendant acted on th~
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advice rn good faith." (1 bid. .. S30.) lt is clear that under
the ev1denee in the instant (•ase the trial court could find, aR
it did. that there was not a fair or full disclosure of the facts
hy defendant to his t~ounsel in good faith It certainly cannot
lw smd that the evidence on this tssue was undisputed
ln·
leed (kfendant 's main c'oneern with his counsel was in conlf'(•tion with his
with his lessee rather than plaintiff
Hnrr>over it should b!' observl?d that nndl?r section 3306 oi
iR not being allowed pnnitivl? damage'
the Civil Code.
If there is had faith. the damage~ recoverabll? are still actuar
rlamagP!' suffered Hencl? therP iR morP reason why the advict•
of counsel faetor in ftscertaining good or bad faith should
meet all the safeguards placed around it in other situations
Such is not the statp of the recorrl here.
T would. therefore. affirm the judgment.
Gibson. C. J .. and 'l'raynor, J ., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied December
11, 1957 Gibson, C. J .. Carter. ,J., and Traynor, J., wert:of the opimon that the petition should be granted.
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GER'l'RUDE LEW lS, Appellant, v. ULYSSES LEWIS,
Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Foreign Divorce-Collateral Attack.-A wife who
secured a .Judgment ot separat~ wamtenancco m [llinms (th~
state ot her dormciJe) afte1 the renditiOn ot a valid divoret·
decree for the husband tn ~evada wa8 not precluded frow
enforcmg her rrg·ht to support m Califorma. the state of thf'
husband's present domwile. where the husband did not mvok<'
the Nevadll divorce decree in the Lllmm,. proceeding: even It
such decree had been pleaded as a defense m that proceedm~
and the fllmms court bad erroneously failed to recogmze 1t
the husband'~ remedy was bv appeal and he cannot attack thf'
IlhnoJs JUdgment tn ll subsequent proceeding in California to
enforce thP wif~>'s rig-ht to support.

*

(1] See CaLJur.2d, Divorce and Separation. 315; Am.Jur ..
Divorce and SeparatiOn. 9 742 et seq.
McK Dig. References: [ 1] Divorce. ~ 307; [2, 3, 6,] Divorce,
~ 304; [ 4) Divorce, § 306.1 ; [5] Divorce, § 305.

